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THE HUMBUGS OF THE ANTI-
REGULATORY MOVEMENTt
Lisa Heinzerlingtt & Frank Ackermanttt
It is so hard to get beyond cynicism these days. Even a sympo-
sium devoted to this goal has, as reflected in the articles by Professors
Cynthia Farina, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Mark Seidenfeld, succeeded
primarily in suggesting that regulators are not so much selfish as they
are obtuse, stubborn, and sometimes downright dumb. Undoubtedly
this is true some of the time. But Farina, Rachlinski, and Seidenfeld
want to convince us that it is true enough of the time to warrant quite
large-scale solutions. In this Comment, we take issue with this pessi-
mistic assessment of regulatory behavior by discrediting the most
prominent empirical demonstrations of this gloomy account.
These empirical studies have focused in particular on environ-
mental regulation. Critics of environmental regulation frequently in-
voke a body of research purporting to show that such regulation costs
too much and achieves too little, and that either the same benefit
could be achieved at a far lower cost or that a much higher benefit
could be achieved at the same cost. This body of research consists of
three basic kinds of studies: first, some studies have concluded that
current regulatory strategies cost a huge amount of money for every
life they save; second, some studies have used the findings of the first
set of studies in order to demonstrate how a reordering of our regula-
tory priorities could save either many lives or a lot of money; and fi-
nally, several studies have purported to find that above a certain level
of regulatory expenditures, lives will be lost due to the expenditures
alone.
The numbers served up by these studies cannot help but perplex
and disturb you, even if (maybe especially if) you are in favor of pro-
tecting human health and the environment. We spend, we are told,
$72 billion to save a single person from dying from exposure to for-
maldehyde.1 We spend $99 billion to reduce chloroform exposures
t This Comment is adapted from our forthcoming book, FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA
HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: HuMAN HEALTH, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND THE LIrIrrS OF THE
MARKET (forthcoming 2002).
tt Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
ttt Research Director, Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts
University.
1 John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1986, at 25, 30
tbl.4.
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enough to save a single year of one person's life.2 We could save
60,000 more lives every year if we regulated more intelligently.3 The
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed standards for
soot and smog will kill 27,000 people every year because they cost so
much money.4
If these numbers are right, then the current system is not only
expensive; it is deadly. Thus, it is no wonder that critics of regulation
have fixated on the kinds of figures cited above-figures used to show
that the current system is wildly cost-ineffective and that we could eas-
ily find better ways to spend our life-saving money. Statistics like these
are widely circulated and widely accepted in the academic and popu-
lar literature on risk regulation. They have also become ubiquitous in
political debates on environmental law. Scarcely a congressional hear-
ing on this subject occurs in which these kinds of figures do not figure
prominently.
In this Comment, we aim to show that, for all their wide circula-
tion and widespread acceptance, these studies deserve no credence.
They are based on studies of the costs of a wide range of hypothetical
regulations, most of which were never implemented, studies under-
taken under the assumptions that the only benefits of regulation are
the most easily studied reduced risks of death and that even these
benefits can essentially be ignored at present because they are as-
sumed to occur so far in the future.
It is not hard to discover who started the myths of absurdly expen-
sive regulations. Follow the footnotes back to the original sources,
and again and again they lead to the same few, repeatedly cited stud-
ies, by John Morrall, John Graham, Tammy Tengs, Ralph Keeney, W.
Kip Viscusi, and Randall Lutter. The tales of "killer regulations" are
based on just a handful of authors, and on an even smaller handful of
hard facts.
2 JOHN D. GRAHAM, COMPARING OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE HEALTH RISKS: TOXIN
CONTROL, MEDICINE AND INJURY PREVENTION 2 (Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Policy Report
No. 192, 1995), available at http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s192/s192.html.
3 Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999: Heafing on S. 746 Before the Senate Comm. on Cov-
ernmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 34 (1999) [hereinafter Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999
Hearing] (testimony ofJohn D. Graham, Ph.D., Director, Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard
School of Public Health).
4 Brief for Respondents Appalachian Power Co. et al. in Support of Petitioners at 18,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426) (citing RALPH L. KEE-
NEY & KENNETH GREEN, ESTIMATING FATALTIES INDUCED By ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EPA's
PROPOSED OZONE AND PARTICULATE STANDARDS 13 (Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study
225, 1997), available at http://v.rppi.org/environment/ps225.html), available at 2000
WL 1299500.
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I
REGULATORY COSTS OF MYrHIC PROPORTIONS
One does not have to read very far into the literature on risk reg-
ulation before running across huge tables listing the costs per life
saved of various federal regulations. The numbers in such tables are
fantastic: according to these lists, we are often spending hundreds of
millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars for every single human life
we save through regulation. Numbers like these have contributed to
the fashionable idea that more attention to such numbers will pro-
mote greater objectivity in risk regulation. The trouble is that the
numbers themselves are not objective.
The most famous of the studies on costs per life saved is one pub-
lished in 1986 byJohn Morrall, a long-time economist at the Office of
Management and Budget.5 A table in this study, reproduced in part
as Table 1, purports to show the cost per life saved of various risk-
reducing federal regulations. 6 According to the table, this cost varies
dramatically from regulation to regulation, from a low of $100,000 per
life saved to a high of $72 billion.7 One-third of the regulations on
the original list reportedly cost over $100 million for every life they
save.8 Not surprisingly, these stunning numbers have been used to
demonstrate that current regulatory costs are not only chaotically vari-
able but also unacceptably high.
As the table shows, the regulations that fare best in Morrall's anal-
ysis-that is, the ones that cost the least per human life saved-are
safety regulations designed to prevent deaths from accidents.9 These
include rules relating to such things as fire extinguishers on airplanes
and safety devices for space heaters. 10 The regulations that fare
worst-indeed, all of the regulations in the costly right-hand side of
Table 1-are regulations designed to limit exposures to hazardous
substances, such as arsenic, asbestos, benzene, and fonnaldehyde. 11
A second, now almost equally famous, study on life-saving costs
essentially replicated John Morrall's results. In research supervised by
John D. Graham-the former director of Harvard's Center for Risk
Analysis and President George W. Bush's nominee to be the White
House's "regulatory czar"-graduate student Tammy 0. Tengs and
several co-authors analyzed the costs of 587 life-saving interventions. 12
5 See Morrall, supra note 1.
6 See id. at 30 tbl.4.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 Seeid.
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effective-
ness, 15 RISK ANALYsis 369 (1995).
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TABLE 1
THE COST OF VARIOUS RISK-REDUCING REGULATIONS
PER LiFE SAVED
Costs per
Life Saved
($1000s)
Cabin Fire Protection (FAA) 20(
Passive Restraints/Belts 30(
(NHTSA)
Trihalomethanes (EPA) 30(
Servicing Wheel Rims
(OSHA)
Floor Emergency Lighting 700
(FAA)
Crane Suspended Personnel 900
Platform (OSHA)
Side Doors (NHTSA) 1300
Hazard Communication 1800
(OSHA)
Grain Dust (OSHA) 2800
Benzene/Fugitive Emissions 2800
(EPA)
Radionuclides/Uranium 6900
Mines (EPA)
Asbestos (OSHA) 7400
Regulation (Agency) Regulation (Agency)
Steering Column Protection 100 Arsenic/Glass Plant (EPA) 19,200
(NHTSA) Ethylene Oxide (OSHA) 25,600
Unvented Space Heaters 100 Uranium Mill 27,600
(CPSC) Tailings/Inactive (EPA)
61.800
Costs per
Life Saved
($1000s)
Coke Ovens (OSHA)
4 -
Asbestos (EPA)
Arsenic/Glass
Manufacturing (EPA)
Radionuclides/DOE
Facilities (EPA)
104,200
142,000
210,000
Acrylonitrile (OSHA) 308,000
Benzene/Ethylbenzenol 483,000
Styrene (EPA)
Arsenic/Low-Arsenic 764,000
Copper (EPA)
Benzene/Maleic Anhydride 820,000
(EPA)
Land Disposal (EPA) 3,500,000
EDB (OSHA) 15,600,000
Formaldehyde (OSHA) 72,000,000
Source: John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov./Dec.
1986, at 25, 30 tbl.4
(For brevity, we will refer only to the lead and senior authors, Tengs
and Graham.) The interventions examined by Tengs and Graham fell
into three broad categories: fatal injury reduction, toxin control, and
medicine.'5 Fatal injury reduction encompassed measures like air-
plane safety, automobile safety, and fire prevention. 14 Toxin control
included measures to control arsenic, asbestos, benzene, and other
hazardous substances.' 5 The medical category included a wide variety
of preventive and curative measures ranging from childhood vaccines
to advice about quitting smoking.16
Like John Morrall before them, Tengs and Graham found that
cost-effectiveness ranged widely across interventions and that costs per
13 See id. at 370.
14 See id. app. A, at 373-75.
15 See id. app. A, at 375-78.
16 See id. app. A, at 378-84.
2002]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
life-year saved often reached very high levels. 17 They also found, just
as Morrall did, that controlling toxins was generally the most expen-
sive way to save human lives."' They found that the costs of toxin
control ranged from less than or equal to zero (meaning that the in-
terventions saved more money than they cost) to an incredible $99
billion for every life-year saved. 19 Tengs and Graham's estimates of costs
have, like Morrall's estimates, figured prominently in critiques of envi-
ronmental law. Table 2 reproduces one portion of Tengs and Gra-
ham's table, reporting the costs of controlling pollution at paper
mills.
TABLE 2
THE COSTS PER LIFE-YEAR SAVED OF POLLUTION CONTROL
AT PAPER MILLS
Intervention Cost/Life-Year (S)
Chloroform emission standard at 17 low cost pulp mills
Chloroform private well emission standard at 7 papergrade suffite
mills
Chloroform private well emission standard at 7 pulp mills
Chloroform reduction by replacing hypochlorite with chlorine
dioxide at I mill
Dioxin emission standard of 5 lbs/air dried ton at pulp mills
Dioxin emission standard of 3 (vs. 5) lbs/air dried ton at pulp
mills
Chloroform emission standard of 0.001 (vs. 0.01) risk level at pulp
mills
Chloroform reduction by replace [sic] hypochlorite with chlorine
dioxide at 70 mills
Chloroform reduction at 70 (vs. 33 worst) pulp and paper mills
Chloroform reduction at 33 worst pulp and paper mills
Chloroform private well emission standard at 48 pulp mills
_ 0
25,000
620,000
990,000
4,500,000
7,500,000
7,700,000
8,700,000
15,000,000
57,000,000
99,000,000,000
Source: Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their
Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISKANALYSIS 369, app. A, at 377 (1995)
There are three major problems with these studies on regulatory
costs:
* they are full of regulations that were never adopted, in some cases
never even proposed;
o they ignore risks and benefits other than human deaths, and rely
on shoddy and incomplete assessments of risks in general; and
17 See id. app. A.
18 See id. at 371.
19 See id. app. A, at 375-78.
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* they play a statistical trick with future cancer deaths that devalues
the lives of the elderly, and is dismissive of long-term risks to
everyone.
Far from offering an objective basis for reforming our regulatory sys-
tem, these studies simply, and quite invisibly, translate political objec-
tions to environmental regulation into numerical form.
A. Regulations That Aren't
The first big problem with these studies is that they include many
life-saving interventions that have never been implemented by any
agency; indeed, they include many interventions that have never even
been proposed by any agency. Yet those regulations that never hap-
pened have been treated as reflections of the way the current regula-
tory system operates.
For example, fully half of the regulations on John Morrail's list
costing more than $5 million per life saved were never implemented
by any regulatory agency. Many of them were rejected for the very
reason that their benefits were not deemed to justify their costs. The
rules regarding benzene provide a case in point.
In 1980, EPA proposed new rules for benzene emissions under
the Clean Air Act.20 Four years later, while President Reagan was in
office, EPA withdrew the proposed standards21 in a rulemaking pro-
ceeding cited in three different places in Morrall's original table (and
reflected in the standards shown in Table 1 that cost $483 million and
$820 million per life saved). In withdrawing the proposed standards,
EPA asserted that "both the benzene health risks (annual leukemia
incidence and individual lifetime risk from high exposure) to the pub-
lic from these source categories and the potential reductions in health
risks achievable with available control techniques are too small to war-
rant Federal regulatory action under.., the Clean Air Act."22 The
agency emphasized that, since the time that the standards had been
proposed, the benzene emissions in question had been reduced by a
larger amount than could be achieved by new control measures. 23 As
20 See Benzene Emissions from Benzene Storage Vessels; National Emission Standard
for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,952 (proposed Dec. 19, 1980); National
Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from Ethylbenzene/
Styrene Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,448 (proposed Dec. 18, 1980); National Emission Standard
for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, 45 Fed.
Reg. 26,660 (proposed Apr. 18, 1980).
21 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions
from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels,
49 Fed. Reg. 23,558 (proposed June 6, 1983).
22 Id. at 23,558.
23 See id. at 23,562.
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a result, the remaining risks from these facilities were lower than EPA
had originally estimated.24
The agency analyzed several possibilities for regulating these re-
maining risks, concluded that they were all too expensive for the mod-
est benefits they provided, and therefore declined to make any new
proposals to replace the withdrawn standards.25 The benzene stan-
dards cited by Morrall are precisely the ones for the remaining risks
that EPA analyzed and rejected as too expensive.
Given this history, the inclusion of EPA's 1984 decisions on Mor-
rall's list is puzzling. Regulations having the risk and cost profiles
cited by Morrall were never even proposed. The risk estimates cited
by Morrall were reported by EPA as a reason to reject further regula-
tion of benzene.
Thus, no one ever spent the $483 million or $820 million per life
saved that is reported in Table 1, and no government agency ever pro-
posed spending these amounts. Moreover, these regulations were
withdrawn because EPA concluded that the risks they would have reg-
ulated were too small to warrant regulatory action. At least according
to critics of regulation, these non-regulations deserve a place of honor
on any table documenting agency performance. Instead, they are
among the ten most expensive regulations at the very bottom of Mor-
rall's list. To be sure, in his original table, Morrall noted that these
rules had been rejected. 26 But this is a subtlety that subsequent uses
of the table have largely missed.
The gulf between reported costs and actual programs is even
greater in Tengs and Graham's study. Unlike Morrall, Tengs and Gra-
ham do not limit themselves to discussing measures, or potential mea-
sures, under existing regulatory programs. Their only criterion for
the inclusion of a life-saving intervention on their list was the availabil-
ity of quantitative estimates of the costs and benefits of the interven-
tion.27  As they acknowledge, their analysis did not include
information on the extent to which any given intervention was actually
implemented.28 The result is, predictably, the same as with Morrall.
Although nine of the ten most expensive life-saving interventions in
the Tengs and Graham study involved toxin control, not one of these
nine interventions was ever implemented by a regulatory agency. Sim-
ilarly, not one of the Tengs and Graham paper-mill interventions
listed in Table 2 was ever even proposed by a regulatory agency.
24 See id.
25 See id.
26 Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
27 See Tengs et al., supra note 12, at 369-70.
28 See id. at 372.
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Thus the studies by Morrall, and by Tengs and Graham, demon-
strate conclusively that it is possible to describe a collection of non-
regulations that would have been expensive, had they ever been
adopted. To interpret this "analysis" as describing the real-world per-
formance of any actual regulatory agency is both misdirected and
deeply misleading. Despite the (subtle) concessions of the research-
ers that their cost estimates include measures that were not imple-
mented, it is easy enough to take away from these studies the
impression that they describe the systematic workings, and failures, of
current regulation. John Graham himself has drawn this erroneous
lesson from his own research;29 imagine how confused his readers
must be.
B. Regulations That Aren't About Death
A second important problem with reports like Morrall's and
Tengs and Graham's is that they imply that the only important benefit
of health and environmental protection is to prevent human deaths.
Thus the reports ignore many significant benefits of environmental
programs.30 Most obviously, their fixation on human lives saved ig-
nores nonfatal harms to human health as well as harms to ecosystems,
two categories of harm that often lie at the core of environmentally
protective programs. It also ignores damages to widely shared values,
such as autonomy, community, and equity, that are peculiarly affected
by the kinds of risks posed by toxic substances.
Many health and environmental programs may not be aimed at
preventing cancer and yet may have as a happy by-product the preven-
tion of a handful of cases of cancer. Consider the case of formalde-
hyde regulation, which at $72 billion per life saved, is the most
expensive item on Morrall's list (see Table 1). When the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) decided to regulate
formaldehyde, it did so because of the huge number of cases of pain-
ful and irritating, but nonfatal, skin conditions that would be avoided
by limiting workers' exposure to the chemical. Incidentally, formalde-
hyde regulation also prevents a few cases of nasal cancer. To get to
Morrall's $72 billion number, just ignore all the real reasons for for-
maldehyde regulation, and imagine that someone was foolish enough
to propose it solely as a way of reducing deaths from cancer. Sure
enough, it is an inefficient way of reducing cancer deaths. Workplace
regulation of formaldehyde is not a bad answer, but it does happen to
be an answer to a different question.
29 See GRAHAM, supra note 2.
30 Tengs and Graham themselves acknowledge this fact. See Tengs et al., supra note
12, at 372.
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The risk assessments that underlie the figures on regulatory costs
are not only incomplete, focusing only on avoided human deaths,
they are also questionable on their own terms. Morrall frequently saw
fit to adjust the risk estimates of agencies like EPA and OSHA, despite
the agencies' expertise in this area and his own lack of it. In all cases
in which he adjusted the agencies' estimates of risk, he lowered those
estimates rather than raised them.31 These adjustments amounted to
claiming that the same number of dollars saved fewer lives, thus inflat-
ing Morrall's estimates of costs per life saved-sometimes quite
substantially.3 2
For their part, Tengs and Graham (neither of whom is a scientist)
did not undertake their own scientific assessments of risk. Instead,
they adopted the risk estimates of the analysts upon whose work they
relied for the costs and benefits of various life-saving interventions.
This approach, however, created problems of its own. In numerous
cases, Tengs and Graham examined the same life-saving measure
more than once, but from the perspective of different analysts with
incompatible views. For example, they report two estimates of the
cost per life-year saved of a ban on urea-formaldehyde foam insulation
in homes; one estimate puts the cost at $11,000 per life-year saved,
and another at $220,000 per life-year saved.3 3 Tengs and Graham also
offer two estimates of the costs of controlling arsenic emissions at glass
plants: one estimate is $2.3 million per life-year saved, the other is $51
million per life-year saved.34 The researchers provide no guidance as
to how one might choose between these strikingly different perspec-
tives on the cost-effectiveness of the very same life-saving measures.
They also do not face up to the strange consequence of their duplica-
tion of life-saving measures: one might conclude that we could save a
large amount of money in arsenic control simply by adopting the
views of the $2 million analyst rather than the $51 million analyst!
C. Deaths That Aren't About to Happen
The final problem with these studies involves their treatment of
policies that are designed to avoid deaths or other harms in the fu-
ture. This is particularly important in evaluating regulation of toxins.
Often the only quantified benefit of toxic substance control is the pre-
vention of cancer. Because cancer has a long latency period, today's
31 See Morrall, supra note 1, at 28-29.
32 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE LJ. 1981,
2025-38 (1998), reprinted in 30 LAND USE & ENV'T L. REv. 227 (1999) (selected as one of
the best environmental law articles of 1998).
33 Tengs et al., supra note 12, app. A, at 377.
34 Id. app. A, at 375. Tengs and Graham's study refers to regulation of arsenic emis-
sions at "glass plants" and "glass manufacturing plants"; these are one and the same in
EPA's regulations. See Heinzerling, supra note 32, at 2013.
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new regulation may have benefits in avoiding cancer deaths some de-
cades from now. Morrall, and Tengs and Graham, discount those fu-
ture deaths, treating them as less significant than deaths today.35 This
statistical maneuver devalues the life-saving benefits of measures that
prevent cancer, and creates moral dilemmas by implying that some
people's lives are more valuable than others.
Discounting is a procedure developed by economists, originally
used to evaluate investments that produce future income. A dollar
ten years from now is worth less than a dollar today, even in the ab-
sence of inflation. So it makes sense to "discount" a dollar you will
receive ten years from now, treating it as worth somewhat less than a
dollar today. However, the indiscriminate extension of discounting
techniques to health and environmental benefits causes numerous dif-
ficulties, and encourages dismissal of serious future events.a6 The two
"costs per life saved" studies we have been discussing implement dis-
counting in different ways, both of them problematic and internally
contradictory.
We begin with Morrall's methodology. As noted, his table focuses
on costs per life saved, and virtually all of the lives saved by environ-
mental regulations on his list reflect cancer cases avoided. His prac-
tice is to discount the number of lives saved to reflect the latency
period of cancer, which typically ranges from ten to forty years de-
pending on the type of cancer.3 7 Thus, even if a regulation issued
today begins to reduce exposures to a carcinogen today, and hence
begins to reduce the risk of cancer today, Morrall would not "credit"
this regulation with saving any lives until the latency period for the
cancer caused by this substance had passed.
For example, whereas the OSHA rule limiting arsenic exposures
in the workplace would prevent an estimated 11.7 future cancer cases
per year, Morrall's discounting converted this estimate to approxi-
mately 0.35 current cases prevented per year.8s Discounting along
these lines, applied throughout his table, systematically downgrades
the importance of actions taken to prevent long-latency diseases and
long-term ecological harm. Yet these long-term aspirations are among
35 See Morrall, supra note 1, at 28; Tengs et al., supra note 12, at 370.
36 This issue is addressed at length in our forthcoming book. See AcKERmAN &
HEINZERLING, supra note t (forthcoming 2002); accord FRANK AcGKP.mAN, WHY Do WE RE-
CVCLE? MARKETS, VALUES, AND PUBLIC Poucy 45-60 (1997); Frank Ackerman & Kevin Gal-
lagher, Getting the Prices Wrong- The Uses and Abuses of Market-Based Environmental Policy, in
TAKING SIDES ON ECONOMIC ISSUES (T. Swartz & F. Bonello eds., 2001); Lisa Heinzerling,
Discounting Life, 108 YALE L.J. 1911 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34
LAND & WATER L. REv. 39 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Environmental Law and the Present Fu-
ture 87 GEO. LJ. 2025 (1999), reprinted in 31 LAND USE & ENV'T L. REv. 305 (2000) (se-
lected as one of the best environmental law articles of 1999).
37 See Morrall, supra note 1, at 28.
38 See id. at 30 tbl.4.
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the major aims of the health and environmental rules that have fared
so poorly in analyses of costs per life saved.
By greatly deflating life-saving benefits, discounting greatly in-
flates costs per life saved. In Morrall's study, if one adopts the agen-
cies' estimates of risk and does not discount for latency, the costs per
life saved of virtually all of the regulations on his list drop to below $5
million-the number viewed by some economists as the "value of a
statistical life."3 9 Table 3 compares the regulatory agencies' own esti-
mates for selected regulations (without discounting), to Morrall's esti-
mates, reflecting both his re-estimation of risks and his discounting of
future deaths.
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF AGENCIES' ESTIMATES TO
MoRVALL's ESTIMATES
Regulation (Agency, Year) Agency Estimate Morrall's Estimate
(in thousands of 1995 dollars per life saved)
Asbestos (OSHA 1972) 700 11,000
Benzene (OSHA 1985) 2570 25,400
Arsenic/Glass Plant (EPA 1986) 6610 28,500
Ethylene Oxide (OSHA 1984) 3020-5780 38,000
Uranium Mill Tailings/Inactive (EPA 1983) 2410 41,000
Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978) 8570 55,900
Uranium Mill Tailings/Active (EPA 1983) 3840 78,800
Coke Ovens (OSHA 1976) 12,420 91,900
Asbestos (OSHA 1986) 3860 132,600
Arsenic (OSHA 1978) 24,490 137,600
Arsenic/Low-Arsenic Copper (EPA 1986) 5740 1,136,600
Land Disposal (EPA 1986) 3280 5,207,000
Formaldehyde (OSHA 1985) 31,100 107,120,000
Source: Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J.
1981, 2039-40 tbls.3-4 (1998)
Discounting along these lines assumes that a particular kind of
life-saving intervention-one that prevents long-latency human dis-
ease and therefore usually saves older people's lives-represents a
less-valued use of our regulatory resources. Starting from this pre-
mise, one will inevitably end up concluding that regulation that saves
the lives of the elderly and that prevents cancer is not as important as
39 Cf W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
20 (1992) [hereinafter Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS] (proposing that the value of a statistical
life is between $3 and $7 million); W. KP VIscusI, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (1998); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1912, 1942 (1993)
(same).
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other kinds of regulation. This is a very sophisticated and circuitous
form of question-begging, but it is question-begging nonetheless.
Discounting of avoided future cancer deaths is also flatly inconsis-
tent with the reigning economic method for calculating the value of
life-saving measures. It would be absurd to assign a monetary value to
certain death; virtually everyone would refuse to accept any amount of
money in exchange for their own death. Rather, economists seek to
assign a value to small reductions (or increases) in risk.40 If the "com-
modity" being priced in economic analyses of life-saving measures is
risk, and not life itself, then the practice of discounting from the end
of the latency period for cancer is misguided. One should instead
discount only from the date when risk is reduced. This seemingly mi-
nor and technical change would have a large effect on estimates of
regulatory costs because most regulations begin to reduce risks as
soon as they impose costs-which, from any perspective, eliminates
the need for discounting.
Tengs and Graham, focusing on life-years saved by regulations,
adopt a different, but equally suspect, approach to discounting.
Rather than discounting each avoided death from the year in which it
would have occurred (Morrall's method), Tengs and Graham sepa-
rately discount each year of life saved by regulatory intervention,41
yielding results that are both morally problematic and technically in-
compatible with the way almost everyone else describes costs and
benefits.
By counting life-years instead of lives, Tengs and Graham assume
that it is better to save more rather than fewer life-years. Put simply,
this means that, in their view, a measure that saves the lives of the
elderly is not as good as one saving the lives of the middle-aged, and
likewise, a measure saving the lives of the middle-aged is not as good
as one saving the lives of the young. However, their unusual approach
to discounting (revealed only by digging deep into their equations,
not by reading their text) means that their bias toward the young is
not as pronounced in practice as one might expect.
To put the point more concretely, suppose that a regulation pre-
vents a kind of accident that, on average, kills 35-year-olds. Further
suppose that the average life expectancy of the entire population is 77
years.42 A regulation preventing this kind of accident would, on aver-
age, save 42 life-years per accident prevented. Preventing this acci-
dent is more valuable, for Tengs and Graham, than saving the last
40 See, e.g., Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 39, at 20; Viscusi, supra note 39.
41 See Tengs et al., supra note 12, at 370.
42 Tengs and Graham appear to make this assumption, using the same life expectancy
for people of all ages-a mistaken assumption, given that life expectancy increases as one
ages.
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remaining year of life for a 76-year-old, but thanks to discounting it is
not 42 times as valuable. In calculating the "present value" of the acci-
dent prevention measure, Tengs and Graham would separately dis-
count each of the 42 saved life-years, since each would be lived at a
different time in the future. For example, the forty-second life-year
saved by the hypothetical regulation would not have been lived until
42 years from now; Tengs and Graham discount that forty-second life-
year to a "present value" of approximately 1/8 of a current year.43
Any number of calculator games can be played, exploring the
odd and unexpected biases introduced by this approach to discount-
ing. Measures that save younger people's lives now are the most valua-
ble; but measures that will save the lives of today's younger people
when they are older are deeply discounted. The last expected year of
life is worth one full year for a 76 year-old, one-eighth of a current
year for a 35 year-old, and only three-one hundredths of a current
year for a 5 year-old.
Tengs and Graham's peculiar approach to life-years and discount-
ing also means that no one can ever lose a "whole" life. When the lost
years of life are discounted and added up in every case of death, then
no one ever loses the full measure of a life; everyone loses just a part
of a life as measured in life-years. But human lives do not come in
fractions.
Killing older people who have shorter remaining life expectan-
cies is, in most moral or legal systems, just as serious a crime as killing
the young. The stealth rejection of this principle of equality through
Tengs and Graham's dubious arithmetic of risk analysis threatens to
create a startling change in our approach to life and death.
Widely circulated studies on costs per life saved suffer, in short,
from three major flaws. First, they include large numbers of life-sav-
ing measures that were never implemented nor, in many cases, pro-
posed by any regulatory agency. Second, they fix on human lives
saved as the sole measure of the success of regulatory programs de-
signed to achieve multifarious goals. And third, they rely on morally
problematic and internally inconsistent perspectives on the value of
life.
These flaws have not prevented the widespread acceptance of
these studies in the literature on risk regulation. Indeed, despite their
flaws, such studies have served as the foundation for a second body of
research, attempting to show how many more lives we could save if we
did things differently. We turn now to two aspects of this additional
research. One study produces the widely cited claim that different
regulatory priorities could save 60,000 lives annually, at no additional
43 Using a discount rate of five percent.
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cost. And several studies assert that we could save more lives by regu-
lating less. Neither of these conclusions survives careful scrutiny.
II
A STATISTICAL MURDER MYSTERY
If you could save 60,000 lives every year at no cost, would you do
it? This enticing question is the implicit punch line of an additional
study by Tengs and Graham, building upon their "Five-Hundred Life-
Saving Interventions" study. The second study sets out "to assess the
opportunity costs of our present pattern of social investments in life-
saving."44 In other words, what, they purported to ask, do we give up
by addressing life-threatening risks the way we now do?
This later study considered a subset of the 587 interventions in-
cluded in their earlier work-specifically, the 185 interventions for
which data on costs and effectiveness were national in scope.45 Of the
185 measures, 90 were toxin control measures that were under the
jurisdiction of EPA (or would have been, if they had ever been
proposed) .46
In this study, Tengs and Graham found that if our resources were
directed to the most cost-effective of the interventions they consid-
ered, we could either save 60,000 more lives every year with the same
amount of money, or save the same number of lives we do now while
cutting costs by $31 billion.47 Either way one looks at it, if the num-
bers are believable then something is seriously amiss, and even lethal,
in our current way of doing things. Indeed, Graham provocatively
calls the resulting state of affairs "statistical murder":48 we are, he sug-
gests, literally killing people because our life-saving priorities are so
misguided.
Many observers have cited this study as if it shows that government
regulation results in the "statistical murder" of 60,000 Americans every
year. In the introduction to the book in which the study appears, Rob-
ert Hahn claims that the study "compiles new data on hundreds of
44 Tammy 0. Tengs &John D. Graham, ThW Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Invest-
ments in Life-Saving, in RisKs, CosTs, AND LIvEs SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGU-
LATION 167, 168 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
45 See id. at 169.
46 We obtained a complete list of the interventions considered in this study from
Tammy Tengs. Personal Communication from Tammy Tengs to Lisa Heinzerling (April
2001) [hereinafter Tengs Personal Communication] (on file with author). This list indi-
cates that ninety of the interventions were environmental measures. See also Tammy 0.
Tengs, Optimizing Societal Investments in Prevention of Premature Death, app. Q, at 150
(1994) (unpublished Sc.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author) (indicat-
ing that ninety interventions based on "EPA Regulation" were considered in the disserta-
tion which formed the basis of Tengs and Graham's "Opportunity Costs" study).
47 Tengs & Graham, supra note 44, at 172-77.
48 GRAM, supra note 2, at 1.
20021
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
regulatory interventions and estimates their costs and life-saving bene-
fits.,,49 This study, Hahn continues, "assesses the opportunity costs of
the current activity and determines an 'optimal portfolio' of regulatory
activity that could save more lives at less cost. '50 The ink was not even
dry on Tengs and Graham's study, in other words, before it was being
used as an indictment of government regulation.
Subsequent uses of this study have followed the same vein. Con-
gress, for example, has been frequently told that Tengs and Graham's
research shows that a rearrangement of regulatory priorities would
save 60,000 lives per year. 51 John Graham himself has testified that his
research demonstrates that federal regulation is in serious need of re-
form. Testifying in favor of Newt Gingrich's "Contract With America"
bills several years ago, Graham asserted that, based on his research
with Tengs, he was convinced that "a smarter regulatory system" could
"provide the public with more protection against hazards at less cost
than we are achieving today."52
Similarly, Graham recently joined a group of economists in sign-
ing onto a brief filed in the United States Supreme Court in Whitman
v. American Trucking Ass'ns, a case challenging the constitutionality of
the federal Clean Air Act.53 In that brief, Graham and his co-signato-
ries urged the Court to interpret the Clean Air Act to require cost-
benefit analysis of national air quality standards. 54 They premised
their argument on the perceived failings of current health, safety, and
environmental regulation. 55 Citing Tengs and Graham's study, they
asserted:
Both the direct benefits and costs of environmental, health, and safety regu-
lations are substantial-estimated to be several hundred billion dol-
lars annually. If these resources were better allocated with the
objective of reducing human health risk, scholars have predicted
that tens of thousands more lives could be saved each year.56
49 Robert W. Hahn, Introduction to RIsKs, CoSTS, AND LIvEs SAVED: GETrING BETTER
RESULTS FROM REGULATION, supra note 44, at 1, 3 (emphasis added).
50 Id. (emphasis added).
51 The Regulatory Improvement Act of 1998: Hearing on S. 981 Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 105th Cong., app. at 100 & n.4 (1998) (joint prepared statement of
Robert W. Hahn, Resident Scholar, The American Enterprise Institute & Robert E. Litan,
Director of Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution).
52 Regulatory Improvement Act of 1999 Hearing, supra note 3, app. at 113 (prepared state-
ment of John D. Graham, Ph.D., Director, Center for Risk Analysis, Harvard School of
Public Health).
53 Brief of Amici Curiae of AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies et al.,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1426), available at 2000 WL
1015407.
54 See id. at 1-2.
55 See id.
56 See id. (citing Tengs & Graham, supra note 44).
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In the context of his academic work, moreover, Graham has used
his research with Dr. Tengs to launch a large-scale attack on regula-
tory programs that protect health, safety, and the environment, call-
ing the "public's general reaction to health, safety, and environmental
risks" a "syndrome of paranoia and neglect."57 Likewise, Tengs has
based her own support of regulatory reform on her collaborative work
with Graham. 58
Yet the startling, sound-bite conclusions about the cost-ineffec-
tiveness of current health and environmental regulation do not follow
from Tengs and Graham's research. They have failed to identify a
huge body of overly expensive regulations that are actually in effect,
and have proposed only trivial opportunities to enact cheaper life-sav-
ing rules.
Most of the life-saving potential found in Tengs and Graham's
research comes from reallocating expenditures in the field of
medicine, not from reallocating resources used by regulatory agencies
such as EPA or OSHA. Equally important in the area of toxin control,
is the fact that most of the 90 life-saving interventions that Tengs and
Graham considered have never been implemented, and they never will
be. Indeed, as explained above, many of these interventions were re-
jected by the very agencies Tengs and Graham think have their priori-
ties wrong, and they were often rejected for the very reason that their
costs were not justified by their benefits. Many other interventions
were never even proposed by any regulatory agency.
Specifically, of the 90 environmental measures included in this
second study (representing almost half of all the life-saving measures
considered), only 11 were ever implemented by the relevant agency,
EPA. In other words, 79 of the environmental measures included in
this study were never implemented. Most of these were rejected (or
never even proposed) by EPA itself.59 Thirty-one of the environmen-
tal measures were part of EPA's nationwide ban on asbestos products,
which was overturned in a single, controversial judicial decision. 60
57 John D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against Risk at Less
Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 22.
58 See News Conference with Senator Bob Dole, C. Everett Koop, and Others Regarding Regula-
tory Reform, at *8 (Federal News Service, July 17, 1995), available at LEXIS, Nexis Library.
59 For example, 10 of the 90 environmental measures included in the study are bans
on certain asbestos products. However, the study on which Tengs and Graham relied for
their data on the costs and effectiveness of these measures clearly states these products
were never banned by EPA. See GEORGE L. VAN HOUTVEN & MAUREEN L. CROPPER, WHEN IS
A LiFE Too CosTLY TO SAVE? 23 tbl.1 (Env't, Infrastructure, & Agric. Div., World Bank,
Policy Research Working Paper 1260, 1994), cited in Tengs et al., supra note 12, app. B, at
388.
60 See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (overturning
EPA's nationvide ban on asbestos products in part because the court disagreed with the
agency's cost-benefit analysis).
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Tengs and Graham assert that they considered the extent to
which the interventions they discuss have been implemented. Their
explanation strains the meaning of the English language: because
they believe that "some degree of implementation can exist even in
the presence of a 'no-go' decision or can be absent even with a 'go'
decision," they gathered information on the "'percent implementa-
tion"' of each intervention. 61 Rather than accepting the naive notion
that the public record shows whether regulations have been imple-
mented or not, they consulted "independent experts" to determine
the percentage of implementation.6 2
Unfortunately, however, Tengs and Graham do not say which
measures they considered implemented, which unimplemented, and
which partially implemented, and requests for this information have
gone unanswered by Tengs and Graham. However, in a letter sup-
porting Graham's nomination to lead the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), Tengs stated that their study assumed zero implementation
for only 20 of the 185 interventions considered. 63 Yet, as noted above,
fully 79 of the environmental interventions alone were never imple-
mented. The reasons for Tengs and Graham's apparent assumption
that at least 59 rules that were never issued were nevertheless imple-
mented remain mysterious. 64 Here is the sum total of what Tengs has
had to say on the point: "Toxin control interventions that were never
promulgated (or even considered) by the EPA might nevertheless
have some percent implementation, at least according to the experts
we interviewed. '65
The truth of this statement appears to depend on what we mean
by "implementation." The only obvious literal meaning is that, even
absent government regulation, firms were undertaking the environ-
mentally protective measures discussed in the study. If the measures
are as expensive as we are led to believe, this would be economically
absurd for a profit-conscious firm. No empirical evidence about vol-
61 Tengs & Graham, supra note 44, at 170.
62 See id.
63 Letter from Tammy Tengs, Sc.D., Assistant Professor, Harvard University, to Sena-
tor Fred Thompson, Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, regarding confirma-
tion of John Graham as Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget (May 14, 2001) [hereinafter Tengs Letter], available at
http://www.hcra.harvard.edu/nomination/17.html.
64 For example, based on information provided in related research, it is clear that
Tengs and Graham assumed that EPA's nationwide ban on asbestos was fully imple-
mented-which, as noted above, it was not. See TAMMY 0. TENGS, DYING Too SOON: How
COST-EFFECTrENESS ANALYsIs CAN SAVE LIVES 6 tbl.II (Nat'l Ctr. for Policy Analysis, Policy
Report No. 204, 1997) (showing assumption of "100%" implementation of invalidated as-
bestos rule), available at http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s204/s204.html.
65 Tengs Letter, supra note 63.
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untary toxin control undertaken by firms is provided by Tengs and
Graham, nor do they reveal the identity or area of expertise of any of
the "experts" who purportedly endorsed this assumption.
The peculiar treatment of implementation reveals a fundamental
flaw in Tengs and Graham's study. Their entire project is aimed at
identifying a group of life-saving opportunities that are highly cost-
ineffective and another group that are highly cost-effective, in order
to support their argument that to move from the former to the latter
would save lives or dollars or both. The implication of their analysis is
that there is a large pool of resources available from the cost-ineffec-
tive interventions that can be diverted to the cost-effective ones. But if
so many of the cost-ineffective interventions have never been imple-
mented, no such vast pool of wasted resources exists.
Equally important, Tengs and Graham appear to have made no
effort to identify those cost-effective regulations that have already
been implemented to the fullest extent possible. Some of the regula-
tions that Tengs and Graham like best fall into this category. For ex-
ample, the measure that fares best in Tengs and Graham's first study
(and reappears in their second study) 66 is the phasedown of lead in
gasoline, a regulation which in their view produced cost savings rather
than imposing costs. 67 But we did this already: there is, thankfully, no
more lead in gasoline. In other words, this is not a regulation that we
can have "more" of; we cannot keep banning lead in gasoline, over
and over again, in order to produce more low-cost, life-saving results.
It is a myth to think, based on Tengs and Graham's work, that
toxin regulation systematically produces bad results. We have neither
implemented the large set of cost-ineffective regulations that Tengs
and Graham describe nor failed to fully implement the cost-effective
measures they do cite. There are certainly highly efficacious environ-
mental measures still to be implemented; but they are, for the most
part, not addressed in Tengs and Graham's study.
Tengs and Graham are, in fact, curiously silent about exactly what
interventions they are proposing as an alternative to what they re-
present (wrongly) as our current portfolio of toxin controls. Only by
studying Tengs's unpublished doctoral dissertation, written under
Graham's supervision,6 can one learn which toxin controls these re-
searchers favor. As it turns out, most of the toxin controls that fared
well in Tengs and Graham's analysis have already been implemented.
A handful of apparently cost-effective interventions regulating asbes-
tos and benzene were not implemented, but these rules together
would have saved a total of only 24 lives-nowhere close to the 60,000
66 See Tengs Personal Communication, supra note 46, at 21.
67 See Tengs et al., supra note 12, app. A, at 377.
68 See Tengs, supra note 46.
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lives cited in the Tengs and Graham study. The only large life-saving
opportunity in the area of toxin control that is identified by Tengs
and Graham is radon remediation in homes, as encouraged by gov-
ernment funding of low-cost loans, tax write-offs, or other financial
incentives.69
In effect, then, what Tengs and Graham are really arguing for is a
wholesale shift of EPA's responsibilities from the regulation of pollu-
tion of the air, water, and land through mandatory controls on pol-
luters to the encouragement of residential radon remediation-which
typically involves simply caulking basements-through loans and tax
incentives. Nowhere do Tengs and Graham face up to the shrinking,
indeed trivialization, of environmental law that their proposals would
entail.
III
Is RICHER SAFER?
A final set of studies purports to show that regulation designed to
save lives actually can kill people by making them poorer. The claim
is that the cost of regulation may itself increase risk through effects on
personal income. "Richer is safer": income affects health, and so de-
creases in income brought about by regulation may impair health as
well as wealth. 70
Building on studies that find a correlation between wealth and
health, researchers have attempted to identify the level at which regu-
latory expenditures will produce one fatality by reducing individual
wealth. One frequently cited range of estimates for this level is $3
million to $7.5 million, based on a study by Ralph Keeney.71 Kip Vis-
cusi's estimate is much higher: he has reported that a regulatory ex-
penditure of approximately $50 million is required to induce one
fatality, 72 although his more recent work, with John Morrall and Ran-
dall Lutter, suggests that the lethal level is closer to $15 million.73
Each of these studies-by Keeney, by Viscusi alone, and by Vis-
cusi, Morrall, and Lutter-is based on a different methodology. For
his part, Keeney simply considered the relationship, as reflected in
69 See generally Kenneth L. Mossman & Marissa A. Sollitto, Regulatory Control ofIndoor
Rn, 60 HEALTH Pm'sics 169 (1991) (evaluating the costs and benefits of various forms of
radon remediation).
70 For the seminal statement of this hypothesis, see Aaron Wildavsky, Richer is Safer,
PUB. INT., Summer 1980, at 23, 27-29.
71 For the original study, see Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Ex-
penditures, 10 RISK ANALYSiS 147 (1990).
72 See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, in THE MORTALITY COSTS OF REGULATORY Ex-
PENDITURES 9-12 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 1994).
73 Randall Lutter et al., The Cost-Per- ife-Saved Cutofffor Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37
ECON. INQUIRY 599 (1999).
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census data from 1959, between income and life expectancy.7 4 Draw-
ing on this relationship, Keeney offered a set of "illustrative" examples
of how regulatory expenditures might affect life expectancy. 75 The
most frequently cited of these illustrations found that a regulatory ex-
penditure of $7.25 million would induce one fatality.76 In coming to
this finding, Keeney assumed that wealthier people are healthier be-
cause they are wealthier, not vice versa, and that the costs of the hypo-
thetical regulation would be borne equally by all income groups.77 He
also assumed that income losses of any size, no matter how small for
each household, would kill some people.78 Even assuming that a reg-
ulatory expenditure decreased annual household income by only $10,
Keeney was able to conclude that hundreds of people might die as a
result.79 Because there are about 100 million households in the U.S.,
an annual income loss of seven cents per household amounts to a total
of $7 million nationwide, and thus should cause the loss of one statisti-
cal life according to Keeney's method. This result seems to us far-
fetched.
Kip Viscusi's initial methodology for defining the wealth-health
relationship was very different from Keeney's. In research published
several years ago, Viscusi asserted, consistent with his previous re-
search,80 that the value of a statistical life was approximately $5 mil-
lion.8' He also claimed that people tend to spend about ten percent
of any increase in income on risk-reducing measures.8 2 Thus, he con-
cluded, if society had $50 million of additional income, it would
spend $5 million and save one life. If the $50 million were unavaila-
ble to spend (because, for example, it has been spent on regulation),
that life would not be saved, and thus one life will be lost through the
$50 million expenditure.83
In the most recent study in this area, Viscusi teamed with Randall
Lutter andJohn Morrall to produce yet a third methodology for calcu-
lating the relationship between regulatory expenditures and prema-
ture mortality.8 4 Viscusi and his co-authors used the same basic
approach initially used by Viscusi, but with one new twist: they in-
cluded in their calculations the facts that poorer people are more
likely to engage in risky activities (like smoking) than wealthier people
74 See Keeney, supra note 71, at 153 tbl.III.
75 See id. at 154-55 & tbl.IV.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 149.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 155.
80 See supra note 39.
81 See Viscusi, supra note 72, at 9.
82 See id. at 9-12 & tbls.2-3.
83 See id.
84 See Lutter et al., supra note 73.
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are, and that thus not only do poorer people have less to spend on
health-improving commodities, but they also are more likely to en-
gage in activities that damage their health.8 5 Based on this approach,
Viscusi and his co-authors found that one fatality would be induced
for every approximately $15 million in regulatory expenditures. 86
There are numerous problems with all of these studies.87 First,
the socioeconomic determinants of health are more complicated than
Keeney's work assumes. Wealthy people might be wealthy partly be-
cause they are healthy.88 Also, wealth is strongly correlated with other
socioeconomic indicators, like education and social class, that may be
more important determinants of health than wealth itself. In a fa-
mous study of British civil servants, for example, researchers found
that health was more closely tied to social class than to income.89
"Richer is safer" studies also make the unlikely assumption that
the relationship between health and wealth is the same at all income
levels. 90 Surely this is untrue in extreme cases: Ted Turner is not
likely to be less healthy than Bill Gates because he has less money than
Bill Gates. Thus the distribution of regulatory costs, which is ignored
in most of the studies, will make a large difference in determining
whether the costs impair anyone's health. In fact, in his first study of
the subject, Keeney acknowledged that at incomes above approxi-
mately $20,000 per year, health-wealth trade-offs level off.91 In other
words, the effect is strong only at low incomes, and vanishes far below
the Ted Turner level: a person who earns $50,000 is unlikely to be less
healthy than a person who earns $70,000, merely as a result of this
difference in income.
85 See id. at 604 & 606 tbl.III.
86 See id. at 605.
87 For a critique of OMB's proposal to use Keeney's study to evaluate a workplace
health rule, see PROGRAM EVALUATION & METHODOLOGY Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, No.
GAO/PEMD-92-33, RIsK-RISK ANALYSIS: OMB's REVIEW OF A PROPOSED OSHA RULE (1992).
For the most extensive critique of the "richer is safer" thesis in the legal literature, see
Thomas 0. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 40-49 (1998). Accord Adam
M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of Break-
ing the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 324-27 (1995).
88 See, e.g., C.P. Wen et al., Anatomy of the Healthy Worker Effect: A Citical Review, 25 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 283, 283 (1983) (discussing studies suggesting that "healthy worker
effect" is a result of selection for employability, meaning that healthy people are the ones
who get jobs).
89 Eric Brunner, The Social and Biological Basis of Cardiovascular Disease in Office Workers,
in HEALTH AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: TOWARDS A HEALTH POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FrisT
CENTURY 272 (David Blane et al. eds., 1996).
90 Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Polity: The
Potential Role of Health-Health Analysis, in THE MORTALITY COSTS OF REGULATORY EXPENDI-
TURES, supra note 72, at 116.
91 See Keeney, supra note 71, at 153-54 & tbls.IV-V.
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These points have, however, been completely lost in the literature
relying on Keeney to justify an anti-regulatory stance. Indeed, Keeney
himself seems to have forgotten his initial caveats about his own calcu-
lations. In a study purporting to calculate the fatalities induced by
revised national air quality standards for particulate matter and ozone,
Keeney asserted that as many as 27,000 people would die as a result of
regulatory expenditures associated with the standards.92
Perhaps most absurdly, the "richer is safer" argument assumes
that money spent on regulation simply vanishes-it creates no jobs,
no business, no productive gains whatsoever. This assumption, too, is
in error: environmental protection is big business in this country, em-
ploying people who make and install the complicated, expensive pol-
lution-control technologies (even though the costs of these
technologies are, in fact, frequently exaggerated when estimated in
advance of regulation),93 inspect and measure environmental compli-
ance, fill out forms documenting environmental performance, file
lawsuits to enforce regulations, and so on. The people in those jobs
are not poorer as a result of regulation; they are richer. Yet the stud-
ies purporting to find a relationship between regulatory expenditures
and mortality are completely dependent on the assumption that "we"
are worse off as a result of regulation. This, in the end, is the crucial
assumption: the studies prove that environmental regulation is bad for
us only by first assuming that we do not benefit from it.
To uncover the hidden bias in the studies drawing a connection
between government-induced expenditures and mortality, one need
look no further than the limited use to which they have been put.
Every large program, whether it has an educational, military, environ-
mental, or other purpose, imposes costs on some people and creates
jobs and incomes for others. If the "richer is safer" crowd were really
serious about their argument, one would expect them to be con-
cerned about the big-ticket items in the federal budget like national
defense. From Keeney's perspective, for example, this year's budget
for national defense ($325 billion) will kill almost 45,000 people. Yet
no one-not Keeney, or Viscusi, or anyone else who has criticized en-
vironmental law for making people poorer-has suggested that the
military or public schools or other kinds of non-environmental gov-
ernment programs should be scrutinized for their indirect lethal
effects.
92 KEENEY & GREEN, supra note 4, at 13.
93 See, e.g., WINSTON HARRINGTON Er AL., ON THE AccuRAcy OF REGULATORY COST EsTi-
MATEs 23 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper 99-18, 1999), available at http://
wwiv.rff.org/disc.-papers/PDF_files/9918.pdf; Eban Goodstein & Hart Hodges, Polluted
Data: Overestimating Environmental Costs, Am. PROSPECr, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 64.
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There are real debates to be held about the usefulness and effec-
tiveness of education, national parks, missile defense, environmental
protection, and other public programs. But the argument that a pro-
gram makes us poorer is a sure sign of a hidden judgment that the
program is undesirable on other grounds.
IV
THE POWER OF PERVERSITY
In The Rhetoric of Reaction, Albert 0. Hirschman surveyed the intel-
lectual history of conservative responses to the social movements for
social, political, and economic equality.94 He found that few people
reacting to these social movements would come right out and say that
they were opposed to equality.95 Instead, they invoked arguments
based on perversity, futility, and jeopardy--that is, they argued that
the proposed social reforms would backfire, or do nothing at all, or
jeopardize other social progress, or, impossibly, do all three at once.96
The beauty of this rhetoric, for the reactionary critic, is that it hides
stubborn resistance behind a mask of constructive criticism.
Modem regulatory critics' style of argument bears an uncanny
resemblance to these modes of argument which other reactionary
movements have historically found useful. That the critics' general
mode of argument follows a well-worn path might explain why the
empirical details of their argument have escaped critical scrutiny. In-
deed, the statistics drawn from the studies discussed in this Comment
have been cited uncritically in everything from law review articles to
congressional testimony to newspaper opinion pieces. No one seems
to have considered the possibility that these numbers might be wrong,
and wrong by a wide margin.
Of course, affinities between the rhetoric used to oppose univer-
sal suffrage and the rhetoric used to oppose environmental regulation
do not necessarily establish anything about the underlying social mer-
its of these reforms or their rivals. But it is instructive to keep ever in
mind, while one is reviewing yet another daunting set of numerical
findings about the regulatory state and its failings, the possibility that
one is dealing with merely a modern incarnation of an ancient form
of rhetoric.
94 See ALBERT 0. HIRSHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY, JEOP-
ARDY (1991).
95 See id. at 7.
96 See id.
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